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Supreme Court Docket No. 43482-2015 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
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Honorable Christopher S. Nye 
District Judge, Presiding 
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II. REPLY ARGUMENT 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order made no ruling whether 
the Perpetual Easement Agreement was unenforceable because it lacked a 
sufficient legal description. 
Tiller White provides no legal argument whatsoever contradicting or challenging the 
facts, law and legal arguments asserted by Canyon Outdoor for reversal of the district court's 
ruling that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was unenforceable against Tiller White because it 
was protected as a bona fide purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. Due to the lack 
of any challenging argument, it appears Tiller White concedes to the facts, law and legal analysis 
asserted by Canyon Outdoor in support of the proposition that Tiller White was not a bona fide 
purchaser protected under the statutes warranting reversal of the district court's decision 
articulated in its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on June 4, 2015. 
Instead, Tiller White raises a new issue of whether the easement was enforceable in either 
law or equity, because it lacked a sufficient legal description as an alternative theory to affirm 
the district court's ruling. 
Therefore, without repeating the facts, law and legal arguments provided in its 
Appellant's Brief for the reasons and analysis explaining why Tiller White was not a bona fide 
purchaser in this case, Canyon Outdoor wiil focus its arguments specific to the arguments raised 
in Respondent's Brief. 
For purposes of clarity and understanding, the Memorandum Decision and Order entered 
by the district court pertaining only to its ruling that the easement agreement was unenforceable 
against Tiller White stated the following at the outset: 
Plaintiff argues that the easement agreement is unenforceable because it has no 
legal description and was unrecorded. Defendant argues that it is enforceable 
because of the doctrine of full/part performance and because Plaintiff failed to do 
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,...,u.c,v,u..•uis, investigation to 
is dispositive. 1 
was a 
purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. Based on the district court's ruling it 
can be reasonably inferred that due to the non-recording of the easement agreement, Tiller White 
had no actual or constructive knowledge of Canyon Outdoor' s easement and therefore its 
minimal investigation was reasonable and imposed no duty on Tiller White to investigate further. 
Other than the parties' legal argument in suppor1 of their respective positions on the 
easement issue, the district court did not address the sufficiency of the legal description provided 
in the Perpetual Easement Agreement as a basis that the easement agreement was unenforceable. 
Notwithstanding, Canyon Outdoor will address the new issue and provide an explanation 
for the reasons the issue is irrelevant and not dispositive. 
B. The Perpetual Easement Agreement was valid and enforceable under the 
doctrines of full and part performances satisfying the Statute of Frauds. 
In the alternative, Tiller White argues that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was invalid 
because it did not contain a sufficient legal description. In support of the argument, it refers to 
Idaho's"statute of Frauds contained in Idaho Code§§ 9-503. Idaho Code§ 9-503 states: 
9-503. Transfers of real property to be in writing. - No estate or interest in 
real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation 
of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Tiller White cites Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 (2004) 
and Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009) for the legal proposition that an 
agreement is invalid if it does not contain a sufficient legal description. However, Lexington 
1 See Memorandwn Decision and Order, R, p.131. 




conveyance an easement and secondly, 
this matter two aspects. 
estate 




rescinded the agreements and did not perform its obligation in the agreements by conveying 
the property. In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed that the original parties to the 
Perpetual Easement Agreement, i.e. the Knapps and Canyon Outdoor, did in fact, convey an 
easement interest. Tiller White is now attempting to rescind the agreement made between the 
Knapps and Canyon Outdoor for which no evidence in the record exists that disputes its 
performance. 
Tiller White's argument is an attempt to bootstrap or "step into the shoes" of its 
predecessors-in-interest to now assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the Perpetual 
Easement Agreement with Canyon Outdoor. However, Tiller White ignores the fact that its 
predecessors-in-interest admitted that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was fully performed 
taking it outside the requirements of the Statute of Frauds which admission applies to Tiller 
White. 
Thus, the issue is not whether the Perpetual Easement Agreement between Canyon 
Outdoor and the Knapps, now Tiller White, is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but 
instead whether Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-606 and 
Idaho Code§ 55-812 when it acquired the property from the Knapps. As previously explained 
and briefed, Tiller White was not a bona fide purchaser protected under the statutes and Idaho 
law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the legal doctrines of part and/or full performance satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds and are applicable in this case. 
In Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court 
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performance and what acts under doctrine the 
Simons, two brothers and their wives, Newell and Carol Joel 
DeLila ("DeLila"), were joint owners of 1500 to 1800 acres of farmland. See id., 134 Idaho at 
826, 11 P.3d at 22. Newell also owned a house and approximately 60 acres given to him by his 
mother who had also given DeLila a home and land. See id. All of the property was subject a 
Federal Land Bank Mortgage which went into default. See id. The parties discussed possible 
alternatives in lieu of foreclosure on the farmland and it was agreed that DeLila would file a 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy to save the property. See id. To avoid participation in the bankruptcy, 
Newell quitclaimed their interest in the farmland, their house and the approximately 60 acres to 
DeLila which they agreed that once the Federal Land Bank debt was satisfied they would convey 
back the home and 60 acres back to Newell. See id. The parties executed a memorandum 
reflecting their intentions concerning the property which simply described the property as "tract 
#5 Home and 60 acres." See id. 
Newell was notified that the debt was paid off by DeLila and demanded that the house 
and 60 acres be conveyed back to them which De Lila refused. See id. Newell filed a complaint 
for specific performance of the orai agreement as outlined in the written memorandum which 
DeLila denied and asserted various defenses, including the Statute of Frauds. See id, 134 Idaho 
at 827, 11 P.3d at 23. 
Following the trial, the district court ruled in favor of Newell and ordered DeLila to 
convey the home and 60 acres to Newell. See id., 134 Idaho at 826, 11 P.3d at 22. DeLila 
appealed. See id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed DeLila' s defense of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Court noted that DeLila admitted that there was some kind of agreement with Newell but it 








The Court rejected DeLila's defense and noted that Newell fully performed their part of 
the agreement. See id In rejecting the defense, the Court explained the doctrine of part 
performance as follows: 
Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real 
property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the 
agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the purchaser has 
partly performed the agreement. (Citation omitted). "What constitutes part 
performance must depend upon the particular facts of each case and the 
sufficiency of particular acts is a matter of law." (Citation omitted). "The 
most important acts which constitute a sufficient part performance are 
actual possession, permanent and valuable improvements and these two 
combined." (Citation omitted). The acts constituting part performance must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and they must be definitely 
referable to the alleged oral contract. (Citation omitted). 
Id, 134 Idaho at 827, 11 P.3d at 23. (Emphasis added). 
The Court held that Newell performed their part of the agreement and all that remained 
was DeLila to perform her part. See id 
Next, the Court addressed the use of parol evidence to avoid application of the Statute of 
Frauds. The Court ruled as follows: 
Parol evidence is necessary to properly construe the intent of the parties in this 
case and to properly identify the property to be conveyed to Newell and Carol. 
For example, the reference to "tract#5" in the written memorandum is ambiguous. 
There is no "tract #5." Extrinsic evidence was necessary to explain the 
agreement, not to vary, contradict, or enlarge its terms. The agreement executed 
by the parties does not set forth the entirety of the understanding between the 
parties. The extrinsic evidence clearly established that the property to be 
reconveyed was the home and acreage given to Newell by his mother in 1957. 
The extrinsic evidence also established that the written agreement was part of a 
larger agreement that included the conveyance by Newell and Carol of the 1500 
to 1800 acres to Joel and DeLila-property which DeLila now owns exclusive of 
any interests in Newell and Carol. 
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134 Idaho at 828, 11 P.3d at 24. 
V. 
reaffirmed the standard for the application the 
performance and stated: 
8 
of part 
The doctrine of part performance provides that when the parties to an agreement 
fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the 
purchaser has partly performed the agreement." (Citations omitted). Part 
performance is predicated on the existence of an agreement. (Citation 
omitted). To specifically enforce a contract to sell real property by operation of 
the doctrine of part performance, the agreement must be complete, definite, and 
certain in all its terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of 
being reduced to certainty. (Citation omitted). 
As discussed above, the agreement to convey the 4.9 acres is not an enforceable 
agreement under the statute of frauds because it lacks an adequate property 
description. Part performance does not substitute for an incomplete 
agreement, but instead operates to allow an agreement to be enforced when it 
does not comply with the statute of frauds. (Citation omitted). ("There can be 
no part performance of an agreement which was never made."). 
Id., 149 Idaho at 92-93, 233 P.3d at 23-24. (Emphasis added). 
In Haroldsen, the Court held that Bauchman-Kingston failed to satisfy the doctrine of 
part performance to take the agreement outside of the statute of frauds by distinguishing the 
Simons decision in that the parties did not fully deliver the consideration in the agreement. See 
id, 149 Idaho at 93, 233 P.3d at 24. 
In Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 729 P .2d 1068 (App.1986), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals also provided an explanation of the doctrines of full performance and part performance 
as it applied to the Statute of Frauds in Idaho. The Court of Appeals explained: 
When we use the term "full" performance, without qualification, we mean 
performance of all obligations by both sides to a contract. It is universally 
recognized that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to a contract fully 
performed by both sides. WILLISTON§ 528, AT 727-28. Idaho's statute, by 
its own terms, governs contracts "to be performed. . ." Moreover, the object of 
the statute is to prevent potential fraud by forbidding disputed assertions of 
enumerated kinds of contracts without any written basis. This purpose is 
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fully satisfied when the parties themselves accept the contract and mutually 
perform it. For the same reason, the statute of frauds is inapplicable when a 
although not fully performed by both sides is mutually acknowledged to 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § see, 
85 Idaho 551,381 P.2d 802 (1 
111 Idaho at 1008-09, 729 P.2d at 1071-72. (Emphasis added). 
We turn to "part" performance. When we use this term, we mean 
performance by either or both parties of less than all their respective 
obligations under the contract. There is no literal foundation in I.C. § 9-505 
for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract outside the 
statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a 
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare 
I.C. § 9-504 ( explicitly referring to part performance of land sale contracts 
under I.C. § 9-503). Rather, it is more accurate to say that in some 
circumstances, part performance may establish an equitable ground to avoid 
the strictures of the statute of frauds. 
Id., 111 Idaho at 1009, 729 P.2d at 1072. (Emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals went on to discuss the remedy afforded when part performance is 
completed by one side and held as follows: 
Although Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our cases strongly 
point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that 
when one party has fully performed an oral contract within the statute of frauds, 
he is not entitled to collect damages for a breach. Rather, he is entitled to the 
equitable remedy of specific performance. (Citations omitted). 
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but we think the equity 
approach is sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal language of 
Idaho's statute of frauds. 
Id., 111 Idaho at 1009-10, 729 P.2d at 1072-73. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court addressed the doctrine of part 
performance in relation to Tiller White's argument that the Sign Lease was unenforceable under 
the Statute of Frauds because it lacked a sufficient legal description, in relevant part, as follow: 
Defendant performed its obligations under the agreement. Plaintiff contends that 
the doctrine of part performance is only applicable to save oral contracts, and is of 
no help to Defendant because the lease agreement was 'Nritten. However, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has considered a part performance claim in the context of a 
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written contract at least 
P 'ship, 149 Idaho at 89. 
1 Idaho at 
the can save a contract 
Bauchman-Kingston 
statute of frauds. This seems sensible, if part performance is 
enforce an oral agreement, there is little reason to ignore the doctrine in cases 
where the parties have at least attempted to reduce their agreement to writing, 
albeit incompletely, and where the parties acted upon that agreement. 
Defendant's lease is enforceable under the doctrine. 
Plaintiff cites no authority for his proposition that the lease agreement, 
enforceable under the doctrine of part performance, and which Plaintiff admitted 
he was subject to when he bought the Knapps' property, is somehow 
unenforceable now. The Court is unpersuaded by it 
The lease suffers the same recording problem as the easement However, the 
difference with the lease is that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of it As discussed 
above, an unrecorded instrument is valid and enforceable against persons who 
have notice of it Thus, the lease agreement is valid and enforceable against 
Plaintiff. 2 
In the case at hand, the Perpetual Easement Agreement was executed between Tiller 
White's predecessor in interest, the Knapps, and Canyon Outdoor approximately three (3) years 
before Tiller White acquired the property. The Knapps were clearly aware of the billboard sign, 
accepted its presence on their property, received a lump sum payment and admitted that the 
parties fully performed the terms of easement agreement. See R, pp 55 and 69. 3 
Idaho law has long held that the initial selection of a place for an easement fixes its 
physical location. See Manning v. Campbell, 152 Idaho 232,268 P.3d 1184 (2012), see also, 
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619,277 P. 542 (1929). 
It is undisputed that Tiller White demanded Canyon Outdoor and the Knapps to relocate 
the billboard sign to the other side of the Knapp's building away from its building. The billboard 
sign was constructed and has been affixed in the ground in its current location for nearly thirteen 
(13) years. The Knapps were paid a lump sum payment after they executed the Sign Lease and 
2 See Memorandum Decision and Order, R., pp. 133-34. 
3 References cited the Affidavits of Glen Knapp and Rachel Knapp. 
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Perpetual Easement Agreement. 
Dr. testified was aware 
Knapps a sum payment, received and read the 
before purchasing the property and that the Sign Lease was subject to Tiller White's 
purchase of the property. See, R., pp. 85-88.4 
In addition, Canyon Outdoor's billboard sign continues to be permanently affixed 
and located on the property and it expended substantial sums in constructing the 
improvement. See, R., p. 37-38. 5 The value and construction costs of the billboard sign 
was greater than 25% of what Tiller White paid for the entire property. 
Tiller White acquired the property in March of 2006 and for nearly eight (8) years 
since the filing of its complaint, it acknowledged, accepted and acquiesced to its presence 
on the property despite now claiming that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was an 
unenforceable agreement because it lacked a sufficient legal description.6 
The evidence in the record is uncontradicted that Canyon Outdoor fully 
performed its obligations with Tiller White's predecessor-in-interest rendering the Statute 
of Frauds inapplicable to the fully performed contract. See Frantz v. Parke, supra. 
Also, the evidence in the record supports the finding that Canyon Outdoor, at a 
minimum, performed its obligations under the agreement, constituting part performance 
and satisfying the Statute of Frauds, rendering the Perpetual Easement Agreement 
enforceable. 
Based on the evidence in the record, the case authority cited herein and the 
4 Reference cited in the Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia, Exhibit A (deposition of Dr. Tiller). More specifically, p. 16, 
LI. 3-5, p. 21, LI. 20-23, p. 22, LI. 23-25, p. 23, LI. 1-25, p. 24, L. I and p. 29, LI. 9-13 
5 Reference cited in the Affidavit of Curtis Massood. 
6 Tiller White made the same argument concerning the enforceability of the Sign Lease for lack ofa sufficient legal 
description which the district court held was the Sign Lease was enforceable against it. 
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foregoing arguments, Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests this Court that 
performed complying with and satisfying the Statute of Frauds rendering 
enforceable as a matter of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the law and legal arguments asserted in 
its Appellant's Brief, the case law and legal arguments above, Canyon Outdoor respectfully 
requests this Court enter its Order as follows: 
1) Reversing the district court's ruling that Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser 
under the statutes and in favor of Canyon Outdoor possessing an enforceable easement having 
priority and prevailing over Tiller White's interest under Idaho Code§ 55-815; and 
2) That the Perpetual Easement Agreement is enforceable under the doctrines of part 
performance and/or full performance satisfying Idaho Code§ 9-503. 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016. 
By: 
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DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
ED GUERRICABEITIA, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
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